José L. Zalabardo defends a pragmatist account of the meaning of central semantic discourses-ascriptions of truth, of propositional attitudes, and of meanings. On Zalabardo's account, what makes the sentences of these discourses have the meanings they have are the procedures that regulate their acceptance and rejection.

Intro -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Representational Discourse -- 1.1 Propositional Representation and Meaning Grounds -- 1.2 A Version of Representationalism -- 1.3 Reference Failure and Representation -- 1.4 Descriptive Semantics and Foundational Semantics -- 1.5 Conclusion -- 2. The Open-Question Argument in Ethics -- 2.1 Open Questions and Synonymy -- 2.2 The Naturalist Strikes Back -- 2.3 The Argument Revised -- 2.4 Moral Twin-Earth -- 2.5 Moral Motivation -- 2.6 Moral Intuitionism -- 2.7 Conclusion -- 3. The Open-Question Argument in Semantics -- 3.1 Truth Ascriptions -- 3.2 Propositional Attitudes -- 3.3 Meaning -- 3.4 Guidance -- 3.5 Conclusion -- 4. Some Reactions -- 4.1 Pragmatist Representationalism -- 4.2 The Flight from Representation -- 4.3 Representation Regained -- 4.4 Conclusion -- 5. Pragmatist Meaning Grounds -- 5.1 Assertibility Conditions -- 5.2 Justification? -- 5.3 Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use -- 5.4 Assertion and Acceptance -- 5.5 Pragmatist Meaning Grounds -- 5.6 Pragmatism and Its Fellow Travellers -- 5.7 The 'Explanation' Explanation -- 5.8 Conclusion -- 6. Belief and Desire -- 6.1 Belief, Desire, Behaviour -- 6.2 The Intentional Stance -- 6.3 Indeterminacy and Charity -- 6.4 The Ontogenesis of the Intentional Stance -- 6.5 The Curse of Knowledge -- 6.6 The Hybrid Policy and the Meaning Grounds of Belief and Desire Ascriptions -- 6.7 Other Conditions -- 6.8 Conclusion -- 7. Meaning and Truth -- 7.1 Radical Translation/Interpretation -- 7.2 Compositionality -- 7.3 Meaning and Belief -- 7.4 Charity -- 7.5 Permutations -- 7.6 Familiarity -- 7.7 Reference and Causation -- 7.8 Projection -- 7.9 Linguistic Interpretation and Non-linguistic Belief Ascription -- 7.10 Self-Interpretation -- 7.11 Consequences of Pragmatism -- 7.12 Truth Ascriptions -- 7.13 Representational Discourse.

7.14 Wright's Discipline: Cognitive Command -- 7.15 Ideal Conditions -- 7.16 Conclusion -- 8. Harmony and Abstraction -- 8.1 The Problem of Harmony -- 8.2 An Idea of Quine's -- 8.3 Abstraction -- 8.4 Two Readings of Abstraction Principles -- 8.5 Abstraction and Predicate Reference -- 8.6 The Two-Way Approach -- 8.7 Some Consequences of the Two-Way Approach -- 8.8 Abstraction and the Problematic Discourses -- 8.9 Aufhebung? -- 8.10 Conclusion -- 9. The Primacy of Practice -- 9.1 Theoretical Science -- 9.2 Lewisian Humility -- 9.3 Epistemological Challenges to Lewis's Argument -- 9.4 Quidditism and Combinatorialism -- 9.5 Ramseyan Structuralism -- 9.6 Other Options -- 9.7 Pragmatist Meaning Grounds for Theoretical Science -- 9.8 A Pragmatist Progress -- 9.9 Pragmatist Meaning Grounds and Genuine Representation -- 9.10 A Regress Argument -- 9.11 Tu quoque? -- 9.12 Conclusion -- Epilogue: The Meaning Grounds of Meaning-Ground Specifications -- References -- Index.